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Eugenics Then and Now: Constitutional




Borrowing from the ever astute Jane Austen, it is a universal
truth that an expecting mother in possession of reproductive
intentions must be in want of a perfect baby. While perfection is in
the eye of the beholder, advances in genetics have opened up a
world of tools that parents can use to control the reproductive
process and their progeny. These tools, known collectively as
assisted reproductive technologies ("ART"), can range from orally
ingested medication to more invasive techniques such as in vitro
fertilization. Although ART has been traditionally limited to the
context of fertility treatments, prenatal screening and diagnosis are
increasingly utilized by curious parents to gather information about
themselves and their potential children during the reproductive
decision-making process.
However, with this access, parents and societies confront a
broad range of ethical, legal, and personal questions about how the
information should be used. In September 2013, 23andMe, a direct-
to-consumer genetic testing company, was awarded a patent titled
"Gamete donor selection based on genetic calculations."1 The grant
of this patent by the United States Patent and Trademark Office
("USPTO") raised the specter of eugenics and reignited the debate
* J.D. Candidate 2015, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A.
2010, Biochemistry & Cell Biology, English, Rice University. I would like to thank the
editorial staff of Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly for their dedication and
professionalism. I am also grateful to my parents and grandparents for their love and
unwavering support. Lastly, thank you to my wonderful husband, Yuekai, for walking
with me through it all.
1. See Gamete Donor Selection Based on Genetic Calculations, U.S. Patent No.
8543339 B2 (filed Dec. 4, 2009), available at http://www.google.com/patents/US8543339.
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over genetic screening and the extent humankind should tinker with
reproduction for medical and non-medical purposes. Genetic
screening is under particular scrutiny because of its mass
accessibility, non-invasiveness, and availability before conception
and during pregnancy. In this Note, I explore the history and
evolution of eugenics in the United States, the development of
reproductive screening techniques, and the constitutional
boundaries of using genetic information to screen for or preselect
the traits of offspring.
Part I of this Note traces the historical roots of eugenics, its rise
and fall during the early twentieth century, and the landmark legal
decisions that legitimized and repudiated it. Part II delves into the
Supreme Court's recognition of the unenumerated right to
procreative autonomy, including the use of contraceptives and a
woman's right to abortion. Part III examines the development of
DNA databases and genetic screening, and the specter of modern
eugenics that it raises. Part IV advocates that, based on previous
Supreme Court decisions and the direction that reproductive
screening technologies are evolving towards, laws that limit use
should delineate between medical and non-medical uses. In non-
medical uses, laws should articulate the governmental interests in
preventing the harm that may be caused by individual biases in the
aggregate. Part V explores the role that regulatory agencies and
professional codes can play to prevent reproductive screening
technologies from providing a "backdoor to eugenics."
I. History and Evolution of Eugenics in the United States
The Oxford English Dictionary defines "eugenics" as "the
science of improving a human population by controlled breeding to
increase the occurrence of desirable heritable characteristics.,
2
Although eugenics began much earlier in human history, the word
itself formally came into being in 1883, through the social research
of Sir Francis Galton, who derived much of his inspiration from
Charles Darwin's work on natural selection.3 According to Galton,
"the key to human progress would rest on a national program of
better breeding, in which the intelligent and the accomplished, the
2. See Eugenics, Definition, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries
.com/us/definition/americanenglish/eugenics (last visited Mar. 18, 2014).
3. FRANCIS GALTON, INQUIRIES INTO HUMAN FACULTY AND DEVELOPMENT 24
(Macmillan ed. 1883) (Galton coined the word "eugenics;" a term derived from the Greek
words for "well born" and "good breeding.").
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men and women of demonstrated high moral character-the
educated upper classes-would conceive more children, while the
shiftless, the chronic poor, the insane and feebleminded, and the
'criminal class' would be discouraged, preferably prevented, from
breeding at all." 4 The then-emerging field of genetics, especially
Mendelian theories on inheritance, provided the tools and "cloak of
scientific legitimacy" for eugenic goals.'
As a social movement, eugenics reached its peak in the early
1900s, where it was practiced by governments and influential figures
around the world.6 These practices ranged from birth control and
genetic screening, to much more derided policies such as marriage
restrictions, segregation, compulsory sterilization, and most
abhorrently, genocide. The scientific reputation and popularity of
eugenics started to decline around the 1930s following Nazi
Germany's use of it as a justification for the sterilization and
extermination of millions of "undesirables, including Jews and
Gypsies."7
In the United States, the eugenics movement also gained
momentum during the turn of the century among intellectuals and
scientists, and expanded to political action by the government to
reduce the influx of the "genetically inferior.",8 States accomplished
4. See NANCY L. GALLAGHER, BREEDING BETTER VERMONTERS: THE EUGENICS
PROJECT IN THE GREEN MOUNTAIN STATE 1 (1999).
5. Sonia M. Suter, A Brave New World of Designer Babies?, 22 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 897, 902-03 (2007).
6. Daniel Wikler, Can We Learn From Eugenics?, 25 J. MED. ETHICS 183, 184
(1999).
7. See Matthias M. Weber, Ernst Rudin, 1874-1952: A German Psychiatrist and
Geneticist, 67 AM. J. MED. GENET. 323 (1996) ("Ernst Rudin... was one of the major
representatives of German psychiatry, genetics, and eugenics in the first half of the
twentieth century... [and] was influenced early on by... the ideas of social Darwinism
and 'racial hygiene' in Germany after 1890. Rudin began his career in psychiatry at Emil
Kraepelin's clinic in Munich, where he developed the concept of 'empirical genetic
prognosis' of mental disorders. He published his first results on the genetics of
schizophrenia in 1916. From 1917 to 1945 Rudin was director of the Genealogical
Demographic Department at the German Institute for Psychiatric Research.. . Nazi
health policy required a scientific basis to justify its actions, and Rudin's ideas
corresponded partially with this kind of thinking. In 1934 he prepared the official
commentary on the 'Law for the Prevention of Genetically Diseased Offspring.' The
connections of Rudin's department to National Socialism can be understood as one of the
main reasons for the critical attitude towards psychiatric genetics in Germany after
1945.").
8. See Paul A. Lombardo, Medicine, Eugenics, and the Supreme Court: From
Coercive Sterilization to Reproductive Freedom, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 1-
2 (1996).
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this goal through legislation that restricted marriage of the
"feebleminded," immigration quotas on "biologically inferior"
ethnic groups, and involuntary sterilization of mentally deficient
individuals.9 It is estimated that over 60,000 United States citizens
were involuntarily sterilized as part of state legislative enactments
during the reign of eugenics."°
As states continued to adopt sterilization laws in the 1920s, a
growing number of opponents raised constitutional challenges under
the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments.1  In a preemptive
measure, proponents of eugenic sterilization initiated a lawsuit in
Virginia to test the constitutionality of the state's sterilization law,
which had been carefully redrafted to circumvent the legal problems
that brought down prior legislation.
Seventeen-year-old Carrie Buck was the first Virginian chosen
to be sterilized.3 The case, Buck v. Bell,4 ultimately reached the
Supreme Court, where an overwhelming majority of the justices
held that the 1924 Virginia Eugenical Sterilization Act did not
violate due process or equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment. In reaching their conclusion, the justices gave great
weight to expert testimony that stressed the societal benefits of
avoiding hereditary "feeblemindedness," and Justice Holmes
infamously declared that "three generations of imbeciles are
enough."'6 Although the Supreme Court opinion highlighted the
9. DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THE USES OF
HUMAN HEREDITY 100-03 (1985).
10. PHILLIP REILLY, THE SURGICAL SOLUTION: A HISTORY OF INVOLUNTARY
STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (1991).
11. KEVLES, supra note 9, at 109.
12. Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell,
60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30,36-45 (1985).
13. Phillip Thompson, Silent Protest: A Catholic Justice Dissents in Buck v. Bell, 43
CATH. LAW. 125, 127 (2004) (Carrie Buck, a young white woman who was orphaned as a
child, "was placed with foster parents, the Dobbs, when she was three years old and was
removed from school at twelve to help clean their home. At seventeen, she claimed to
have been raped by the Dobbs' nephew and had a daughter out of wedlock, named
Vivian. In 1924, just one year later, she was placed in the Virginia Colony [for the
Epileptic and Feebleminded] because she was allegedly epileptic, feeble minded, and
morally delinquent. Shortly after, Dr. Albert Priddy, the Virginia Colony Superintendent
and prime sponsor of the Virginia sterilization statute, petitioned to have her sterilized
pursuant to the law. The sterilization order was approved, and was subsequently appealed
all the way to the United States Supreme Court.").
14. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
15. Id. at 207.
16. Id.
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underlying racism, class bias, and careless oversimplification of
scientific notions that marked the eugenics movement, Buck
bolstered eugenics policymaking at the time by giving it legal
legitimacy.7 Four years after the case was decided in 1927, twenty-
eight states had implemented eugenic sterilization laws and for over
a decade, approximately 3,000 individuals were sterilized each
year.8
Eugenics also reared its head in United States immigration
policy, which at that time aimed to restrict foreigners from coming
into and remaining in the United States.'9 In the same year when
the Virginia Eugenical Sterilization Act passed, the Federal
Immigration Restriction Act was also adopted.° The latter act
implemented national origin quotas for foreigners that remained in
place until 1965.21 Anti-miscegenation laws were also passed in
twenty-eight states.22 While primarily implemented to prohibit
mixing between white and blacks, the laws also forbade whites from
marrying other minorities, including Chinese, Hindus, Japanese, and
Native Americans.23 Scott v. Georgia,24 Green v. State,'5 Eggers v.
Olson,26 and Jackson v. State27 are a few of the many cases that
upheld anti-miscegenation laws during that era.
What marked the decline of eugenics in the United States was
not so much a result of domestic initiatives as it was due to events
that played out in the international arena. During World War II,
Nazi Germany implemented eugenics programs on a horrific and
unprecedented scale.28 The resulting atrocities need not be and
cannot be adequately addressed in this Note, but they led to
17. KEVLES, supra note 9, at 111.
18. PHILLIP R. REILLY, Eugenics, Ethics, Sterilization Laws, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLICY ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 205,208 (Thomas H. Murray
& Maxwell J. Mehlman eds., 2000).
19. Lombardo, supra note 8, at 5.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 5-6.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 20-21.
24. Scott v. Georgia, 39 Ga. 321 (1869).
25. Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877).
26. Eggers v. Olson, 104 Okla. 297 (1924).
27. Jackson v. State, 37 Ala. App. 519 (1954).
28. Michael Berenbaum, The Uniqueness and Universality of the Holocaust, in A
MOSAIC OF VICTIMS: NON-JEWS PERSECUTED AND MURDERED BY THE NAZIS 20
(1990).
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universal revulsion of Nazi eugenics and made Americans question
their own state laws on the subject.29 In 1947, the Supreme Court
upheld a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to Oklahoma's Habitual
Criminal Sterilization Act.30 The Court found that involuntary
sterilization as a punishment for committing certain categories of
crimes violated the Equal Protection Clause, and rejected the State's
argument of preventing "criminal traits" from being passed down to
future generations.1 It also recognized "marriage and procreation
[as] fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race" and
as a "basic liberty."32 Nonetheless, eugenics programs continued for
several decades.3  The Virginia Eugenical Sterilization Act was
repealed in 1974, but Buck still has not been formally overturned.'
To discuss the dark past of eugenics is not to completely dismiss
it as singularly evil. Rather, it is the complexity of the term, coupled
with the varying intentions and understanding of its practitioners
that makes contextual analysis and discussion necessary as we
grapple with its gray areas today. While it is clear that eugenics and
its accompanying ideas no longer exist in the same sweeping, over-
simplistic, and racially biased form as they did in the twentieth
century, developments within the field of genetics and reproductive
technology continue to raise questions of what lines our society and
laws should draw in eugenics.
29. KEVLES, supra note 9, at ix. ("During the heyday of eugenics-much of the first
half of the twentieth century-social prejudice often overwhelmed scientific objectivity in
the investigation of human genetics. Social distinctions of race and class were commonly
attributed to differences in biological merit. After World War II, however, biologists in
the United States and Britain fought-by and large successfully-to emancipate human
genetics from such biases in order to establish it as a solid field of science that would
explain the complexities of human hereditary and assist medicine by illuminating the
relationship of genetics to disease.")
30. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
31. Id. at 538.
32. Id. at 541.
33. REILLY, Eugenics, Ethics, Sterilization Laws, supra note 18, at 211 ("Although
one cannot point to a moment in which state-sanctioned eugenical sterilization in the
United States ended, a satisfactory date is 1983 when a class-action lawsuit brought by
women in Virginia who had been sterilized without their consent while in state facilities
was settled.").
34. Id. at 211-12.
H. Constitutional Recognition of Procreative Autonomy
Growing legal protection of reproductive rights has also
influenced and will continue to influence the scope of modern
eugenic policies. A line of cases, starting from Griswold v.
Connecticut,35 to Eisenstadt v. Baird,36 to the landmark cases, Roe v.
Wade7 and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey,38 provided constitutional protection for and recognition of
individual interests in procreative autonomy. Griswold involved a
Connecticut law that prohibited the use and distribution of
contraceptives.39  Estelle Griswold, the director of Planned
Parenthood and a physician, was prosecuted for providing
contraceptives to a married woman.' On appeal, the Supreme
Court invalidated the state law and found the right to marital
privacy to be fundamental within the "penumbra" of the Bill of
Rights.41 In Eisenstadt, the Supreme Court struck down a state law
banning distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.42 In
Roe, the Court controversially held that the Constitution gives a
woman the relatively unfettered right to terminate her pregnancy
prior to fetal viability-the time at which the fetus can survive on its
own outside the womb. Casey subsequently reaffirmed Roe and
held that right to abortion is fundamental."
Grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the right of martial privacy and the right to make
procreative choices have also been internalized within a substantial
portion of our culture.45  As Justices Souter, Kennedy, and
O'Connor articulated in Casey: "At the heart of liberty is the right
to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they
35. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
36. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
37. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
38. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
39. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 484.
42. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 446.
43. Roe, 410 U.S. at 147.
44. Casey, 505 U.S. at 834.
45. Id. at 851.
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formed under the compulsion of the State.,46 Therefore, procreative
liberty at the individual level-the right to decide whether or not to
have offspring-includes the freedom to take actions such as using
contraceptives, terminating pregnancies, and using reproductive
technologies.47  Some commentators fear that this individual
discretion, especially as it pertains to prenatal genetic testing and
advanced reproductive technologies, will provide a "backdoor to
eugenics" at the individual level instead of the state level.48
However, procreative liberty is also not absolute. In Gonzales
v. Carhart, the Supreme Court upheld a law prohibiting partial birth
abortions.49 The Court ruled that the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban
Act did not impose an undue burden on the right to abortion.5 ° The
Court continued to say that the State has a compelling interest in
protecting human life in this situation, and suggests the partial birth
abortion method is similar to killing a newborn infant.51 The law
also does not need to give doctors unfettered choice regarding the
method used.2 In sum, according to the Court, a law regulating
abortion is unconstitutional only if it would be an undue burden for
a large fraction of women.53 After Carhart, it is likely that
fundamental liberty or privacy interests in procreation do not
include all manners of reproductive decisions; however which ones
are included requires careful analysis and balancing of interests.
III. Development of DNA Databases and Assisted
Reproductive Technologies
To place fear of a "backdoor to eugenics" in our modern
context requires an overview of the scientific and technological
developments that have shaped and are shaping reproduction. Over
the last few decades, prospective parents' control over the genetic
makeup of their children has evolved from simply deciding with
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Angus Clarke, Is Non-Directive Genetic Counselling Possible?, 338 Lancet
998, 1000 (1991) (contending that "an offer of prenatal diagnosis implies a
recommendation to accept that offer, which in turn entails a tacit recommendation to
terminate a pregnancy if it is found to show any abnormality").
49. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
50. Id. at 168.
51. Id. at 158.
52. Id. at 163.
53. Id. at 134.
I T uto e
FVol 42:
whom to procreate to being able to study the genes of prospective
parents, select the number of viable embryos produced, undergo
various genetic screenings, and use other assisted reproductive
technologies." In 1953, James Watson and Francis Crick discovered
the structure of the DNA molecule." The discovery catalyzed an
effort to sequence the entire human genome. The Human Genome
Project, "an international scientific research project with a primary
goal of determining the sequence of chemical base pairs which make
up human DNA, and of identifying and mapping the total genes of
the human genome from both a physical and functional standpoint,"
was completed in 2003 and has significantly added to our genetic
knowledge.56 At the same time, the reduction in DNA sequencing
costs outpaced Moore's Law. 7
Since the 1970s, families have been able to use preconception,
preimplantation, or prenatal screening to select against various
genetic and chromosomal diseases.8  However, although
reproductive genetic testing has been possible for over four decades,
earlier methods were not widely adopted due to the invasiveness of
such procedures.9 Today, a range of noninvasive tests are available
to expecting mothers.
More recently, preimplantation genetic diagnosis has given
prospective parents the opportunity to screen and select embryos
based on their susceptibility to a spectrum of genetic and
chromosomal disorders.6° Parents and health professionals often
feel an ethical imperative to screen for a variety of hereditary
diseases, such as sickle cell anemia, hemophilia, and cystic fibrosis.61
54. See Jamie King, Predicting Probability: Regulating the Future of Preimplantation
Genetic Screening, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 283 (2008).
55. James D. Watson. & Francis H. C. Crick, A Structure for Deoxyribose Nucleic
Acid, 171 NATURE 737-38 (1953).
56. Institute of Medicine (US) Forum on Microbial Threats, The Science and
Applications of Microbial Genomics: Workshop Summary Appendix D, Glossary (2013).
57. See Kris Wetterstrand, DNA Sequencing Costs: Data from the NHGRI Genome
Sequencing Program (GSP), www.genome.gov/sequencingcosts (last visited Apr. 17,
2014).
58. See Sonia M. Suter, The Routinization of Prenatal Testing, 28 AM. J.L. & MED.
233,235 (2002).
59. See Joseph Woo, A Short History of Aminocentesis, Fetoscopy, and Chronic
Villus Sampling, http://www.ob-ultrasound.net/amniocentesis.html (last visited Apr. 17,
2014).
60. King, Predicting Probability, supra note 54, at 285.
61. John A. Robertson, Liberty, Identity, and Human Cloning, 76 TEx. L. REV. 1371,
1407 (1998).
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In terms of limitations, the screening only provides probabilities that
the fetus will be born with the disease or disorder.62 However, better
understanding of the human genome and improvements in sampling
DNA from mothers, embryos, fetuses have also allowed for more
particularized screening.3 For example, 2009 marked the birth of
the first baby the be screened for a gene that indicates a
predisposition to breast cancer.64
The various private interests and social rationales that drive
parents to undergo medical screening for their prospective
offspring-to prevent future suffering in a child with a genetic
condition, to avoid the economic costs of caring for a child with
serious birth defects or diseases-reflect an unspoken discomfort
with human disabilities and imperfections. That discomfort, coupled
with a bias towards termination when abnormalities are found,
create justifications and attitudes for interference with nature.
Legal pressures for health care providers also create incentives to
encourage prenatal testing to avoid wrongful birth claims. Overall,
use of reproductive screening technologies has very much become
part of the culture of pregnancy.
The desire for information about the genetic makeup of
prospective offspring and action on that information for medical
purposes is within the conventional understanding of protected
procreative choice. But is there a point where acquiring and acting
on that knowledge would cause harms that would justify limiting
either the acquisition or the act? Carrier screening prior to
conception seems to pose the fewest risks of harm. However, when
that screening is used to exclude an embryo or fetus from birth,
questions about the selection itself and promotion of individual-
driven eugenics arise.
62. King, Predicting Probability, supra note 54, at 285.
63. Id. at 309.
64. Kate Devlin, Birth of First British Baby Genetically Screened for Breast Cancer,
TELEGRAPH, Jan. 9, 2009, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/healthnews/
4 208538/Birth-of-first-British-baby-genetically-screened-for-breast-cancer.html (last
visited Mar. 28, 2014).
65. Suter, supra note 58, at 251.
[Vol. 42:2
IV. Legal Line-Drawing in Potential Regulations of
Reproductive Screening Technologies
A. Reproductive Screening for Medical Purposes is Likely Protected
Under the Rubric of Reproductive Autonomy
Although the Supreme Court has given a relatively wide berth
to individual procreative autonomy, including recognizing a right to
use contraceptives and a woman's right to abortion, it has not
directly recognized a right to use assisted reproductive
technologies.66 However, lower federal court decisions may provide
insight into how the reproductive freedom analysis will be applied in
this context.
First, courts have recognized parental rights to make medical
decisions for their children.6  In 1983, a New York Court of
Appeals' case, Weber v. Stony Brook, upheld the right of parents to
make medical decisions for newborns with severe congenital
defects.68 Lawrence Washburn, a stranger to the parents, attempted
to legally intervene in the case of Baby Jane Doe, an infant born
with spina bifida and serious complicating disorders.69 When Baby
Jane Doe's parents chose palliative care over aggressive corrective
surgery, Washburn made repeated attempts to have the New York
courts force the surgery." The Court of Appeals ultimately ruled
that Washburn overstepped his authority, and that the parents'
decision was medically and legally valid.71 Weber set a precedent for
protecting the rights of parents and limiting the rights of
government and unrelated third parties to make medical decisions
for infants.72
Applying Weber to a preconception or pregnancy timeframe, it
is highly likely that parental decisions as to their prospective
children will also be protected. Therefore, if a prenatal genetic
screen suggests that an embryo or early trimester fetus has a severe
genetic defect, it would be within the parent's right to terminate the
pregnancy or discard the embryo (in the case of preimplantation
genetic diagnosis before in vitro fertilization). Furthermore, the
66. See generally Griswold, 381 U.S. 479; Roe, 410 U.S. 113; Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
67. Weber v. Stony Brook, 60 N.Y.2d 208 (1983).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 211.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 213.
72. Id.
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Supreme Court has already held in Roe that embryos, and certainly
gametes, are not persons within the definition of the Constitution,
and that constitutional protection for fetuses is triggered only at the
point of fetal viability.
73
In terms of federal decisions that directly address whether the
procreative autonomy recognized in Roe and Casey extends to
prenatal genetic testing, the only case on point is a 1990 decision by
the Northern District of Illinois, Lifchez v. Hartigan.74  There,
physicians challenged the Illinois Abortion Law, which "prohibited
experimentation on a human fetus unless the experimentation was
therapeutic to the fetus," on the grounds that it violated the
woman's right to privacy in reproduction and that the law was
unconstitutionally vague.75 The vagueness stemmed from the fact
that "experimentation" could also encompass prenatal testing,
which is not "therapeutic" but often used medically.76 The District
Court struck down the Illinois law and concluded that the
Fourteenth Amendment protected a woman's ability to access
prenatal testing. More specifically, the constitutional right to
abortion that is relatively unhindered before fetal viability includes
the right to submit to a procedure that provides information that
assists in a woman's reproductive decision.78
In addition to procreative autonomy, women also have a sex
equality interest in a right to reproductive screening for medical
purposes. Within the family structure, childcare burdens are often
disproportionally placed on women and those burdens become even
heavier when the child has special or additional needs.79 Preventing
women from accessing information about the health risks of her
prospective offspring can often "significantly compromise [a
woman's] ability to make decisions regarding their role in society
and their life path."8
73. Roe, 410 U.S. at 157.
74. Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
75. Id. at 1363; Jamie S. King, Not This Child: Constitutional Questions in Regulating
Noninvasive Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis and Selective Abortion, 60 UCLA L. REV. 2, 44
(2012).
76. Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1366.
77. Id. at 1377.
78. Id.
79. See Priscilla J. Smith, Give Justice Ginsburg What She Wants: Using Sex Equality
Arguments to Demand Examination of the Legitimacy of State Interests in Abortion
Regulation, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 377, 411-12 (2011).
80. King, supra note 75, at 63.
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Those who oppose the use of reproductive screening
technologies often do so on moral grounds-that humans should not
play god when manipulations of the gene pool not only have
individual consequences, but also unknown population-wide
repercussions in the aggregate. Behind that criticism is a fear of
"backdoor to eugenics" and that the rights of individuals with
chromosomal abnormalities or genetic diseases are being violated
when gametes, embryos, or fetuses are screened to prevent their
birth. Some critics raise the argument that screening specifically for
birth defects such as Down syndrome, which often result in early
abortion or a choice to not implant the embryo, violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although the equality concern for disabled individuals in the
context of reproductive screening should not be lightly treated, it
will be difficult to bring them from the realm of bioethics into
applicable law. First, the reproductive choice of parents in the
medical context constitutes private action that, even if
discriminatory, is within their right to procreative autonomy.
Allowing private actors the choice to use preconception,
preimplantation, or prenatal screening does not rise to state action
such that it appears the government is encouraging or mandating
that people take steps to avoid giving birth to a certain class of
individuals. Secondly, even if state action is implicated when the
hospital or clinic applies the screening technology, the Supreme
Court expressed in Washington v. Davis81 that discriminatory impact
alone is insufficient to prove discrimination by the government.2 A
showing of discriminatory intent must also be made.83 Even though
Davis dealt with racial discrimination, the same would likely apply
in this context, especially since the Supreme Court has not extended
"suspect classification" to disabled individuals.' Finally, avoiding
disability in prospective offspring does not mean that individuals
with existing disabilities or diseases are deprived of their
constitutional interests or discriminated against in practice.
81. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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B. Reproductive Screening for Non-Medical Purposes is Likely Subject
to Limited Governmental Intervention
However, a much more difficult set of questions arise when the
selection or screening is done for non-medical purposes, such as to
select for gender, physical traits, intelligence, or beauty. The
23andMe patent implicates this area of non-medical screening.5
Currently, 23andMe's main business is collecting DNA from
customers and analyzing it to provide information about health and
ancestry.86 However, its new patent encompasses trait selection in
prospective offspring, through a tool called the Family Traits
Inheritance Calculator.87 Although 23andMe's official position is
that it has no plans to apply it to that end-a spokesperson for the
company said that the tool offers customers "a fun way to look at
such things as what eye color their child might have or if their child
will be able to perceive bitter taste or be lactose tolerant"--when
the patent application was filed five years ago, the company
"thought 'the technology could have potential applications for
fertility clinics so language specific to the fertility treatment process
was included in the patent."'8 9
Looking at the patent itself, it explains how the inquiring parent
can specify certain traits that he or she wants in a child.' Then,
based on that person's genetic profile, a computerized system
"performs inheritance calculations pertaining to the [traits] of
interest and identifies one or more preferred donors for the
recipient."'" The patent also contains twenty-eight claims that
define three inventions at different levels of generality. Claim 1
defines "a system for gamete donor selection . . ."9' Claims 2
through 10 and 22 are dependent claims that define variations of
that general invention.93 Claim 11 defines "a method for gamete
85. Gamete Donor Selection Based on Genetic Calculations, supra note 1.
86. 23andMe Ancestry, https://www.23andme.com/ancestry/ (last visited Mar. 30,
2014).
87. A 23andMe Patent, http://blog.23andme.com/news/a-23andme-patent/ (last visited
Mar. 30, 2014).
88. Karen Kaplan, 23andMe's Designer Baby Patent is 'a Serious Mistake,' Critics
Charge, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2013, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2013/oct/03/
science/la-sci-sn-designer-baby-patent-23andme-dna-20131003 (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
89. Id.





donor selection . . . "9' Claims 12 through 20 and 23 are dependent
claims that define variations on that general invention.95 Claim 21
defines "a non-transitory computer program product for gamete
donor selection... "96 Claims 24 through 28 define variations on
that general invention by using dependent claims.'
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution empowers
Congress to grant patents, among other avenues, to promote the
"Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.'" 98 Title 35 U.S.C. §101 states that patents
may be granted for "any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof."99  Courts have interpreted this section
broadly."° Therefore, the technology developed by 23andMe
certainly falls within the realm of patentable subject matter."'
However, from a policy perspective, it is debatable as to the wisdom
of granting a private organization, especially one with the backing of
internet juggernaut Google, a limited monopoly over technology
that can analyze DNA from a variety of individuals to identify a
"preferred donor" who would be most likely to produce the traits
that the inquiring parent preselects.1°n As one commentator noted:
"As human existence becomes increasingly embedded in
technology, the impact of traditionally patentable subject matter
upon the exercise of individual liberties grow."1 °3 Furthermore, the
collection of massive genetic data triggers a host of questions about
genetic privacy that is outside the scope of this Note, but worth
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In application, 23andMe and other organizations providing
similar direct-to-consumer genetic testing allow reproductive
screening to become even broader in scope and more accessible.'
In our often competitive culture where parents seek maximum
resource advantages for their children, the prospect of enhanced
traits has a strong appeal."' This pressure is already evident in the
athletic world, where scandals over the use of performance
enhancing drugs have rocked almost every professional sport; from
swimming to baseball, cycling, and more.)° On a societal scale, the
more technology is used to select against lesser non-medical
conditions and traits, the more removed our expectations become as
to what is acceptable or healthy, thereby also changing our medical
expectations. It is not difficult to imagine that this evolution of our
norms may cycle back to individual reproductive choices, and in
aggregate, create the "backdoor to eugenics" that is invocative of
the 1997 science fiction movie GATTACA.1°7
Although procreative and parental autonomy encompass much
of reproductive screening technology, it does not legitimize every
such use of this technology.°8 Even in Lifchez, the protected access
to prenatal testing was in the context of an infertile woman trying to
get pregnant.19 Since reproductive screening technology is now used
not just in the fertility context, Lifchez may be distinguishable.
When it comes to a law that places limits on individual use of
reproductive technology to screen for traits, an appropriate frame of
inquiry in balancing reproductive autonomy and state interests is to
first ask whether the technological use is "centrally connected with
reproductive choice," followed by whether use of the technology is
likely to cause harm to others."' The less connected a use is to
protected constitutional values, the less scrutiny the law faces.'
104. See Gamete Donor Selection Based on Genetic Calculations, supra note 1.
105. Rick Maese, Gene Therapy's Impact on Sports Worries Experts: It Could Be Used
to Create Bigger, Stronger, Faster Super-Athletes, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 22, 2005,
available at http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2005-05-22/news/0505220263-1-gene-
therapy-steroids-sports-officials (last visited Apr. 2, 2014).
106. Id.
107. GATTACA, IMDB.COM, http://www.imdb.com/title/tto119177/ (last visited Apr.
17, 2014).
108. See generally Roe, 410 U.S. 113; Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
109. Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. 1361.
110. King, Predicting Probability, supra note 54, at 327.
111. See Roe, 410 U.S. 113; Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
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With regards to the first question, the use of reproductive
screening for non-medical purposes, although related to
reproductive choice, usually has a less central connection than if
done for medical purposes such as to prevent disease. In addition,
sex equality concerns for women are diminished in this circumstance
since it does not increase her baseline burden of childcare.
Nonetheless, for some women and in certain cultures, a non-medical
characteristic may still be central to her reproductive choice, and
thus presumptively protected against restriction. Therefore, the
core of the difference lies in the second question: likelihood of harm
to others. Screening for certain traits is unlikely to be linked to
animus against a particular group in the medical context. After all,
with some localized variances, diseases and genetic mutations as a
whole affect individuals across races and genders. However,
allowing selection for certain non-medical traits brings in high risks
of racial and gender bias, among others, that are invocative of
eugenics in the early twentieth century. If certain traits-gender,
body type, eye color, stature, for example-can be selected against,
individual choice, when aggregated, will lead to both fewer people
with such traits and less tolerance for diversity. It can also
exacerbate existing prejudices against individuals with the
disfavored traits. In such cases, there are strong state interests in
limiting the use of screening to prevent the physical, psychological,
and social harms that may result.
Inequality and societal harm have already manifested in the
practice of genetic prescreening for gender. Gender imbalances
already pose significant societal problems for countries like India
and China.112  Due to cultural biases, such screening
disproportionally and negatively impacts females since sex selection
strongly favor males. In the Asia region, this has resulted in the loss
of over 160 million potential females and skewed male to female
ratio to biologically impossible levels."3 This imbalance has created
and will continue to create growing sexual violence towards women,
forced marriages, and unrest among young males who cannot find
partners."4  Since the government has a compelling interest in
maintaining a natural female to male ratio, a law limiting the use of
reproductive technologies for gender-screening purposes may be
112. MARA HVISTENDAHL, UNNATURAL SELECTION: CHOOSING BOYS OVER
GIRLS, AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF A WORLD FULL OF MEN 6 (2011).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 15.
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upheld by the court as long as it is narrowly tailored.115 Several
countries have already enacted such legislation. For example, both
the United Kingdom's Human Fertilization and Embryology Act"6
and Canada's Assisted Human Reproduction Act"7 ban sex-
selection practices for non-medical reasons. The latter bans "any
procedure.., that would ensure or increase the probability that an
embryo will be of a particular sex, or that would identify the sex of
an in vitro embryo, expect to prevent, diagnose or treat a sex-linked
disorder or disease.
1 18
However, opponents of a similar ban in the United States may
criticize it as overly broad since it will include inquiring parents who
may not be screening for gender out of a bias against one or the
other. He or she could be doing so out of secondary interests such
as having children with a mix of genders or simply out of curiosity.
Perhaps more importantly, a blanket ban would not prevent a
woman who does not undergo any early screening from finding out
the sex of the fetus during the second trimester, and aborting the
fetus then. Although this may appear extreme, the overarching
principal can be applied to other non-medical reproductive
screening that is rooted in prejudices that are more prevalent in the
United States.
C. Judicial Scrutiny Along the Reproductive Timeline
In the regulation of reproductive screening for non-medical
purposes, timing also matters. The prelude to reproductive choice is
the choice of who to mate with-or in the donor context, whose egg
or sperm to use. Within certain societal bounds, people are free to
make that decision, and thus indirectly, screen for their future
children's race, eye color, and other features. It would be near
impossible for governmental restrictions on natural mate choice to
pass constitutional muster.
The United States also currently takes a laissez-faire approach
to commercial egg donations. Societal preference for certain traits
over others is especially evident when looking at the market value of
donor eggs. A cursory examination of the ad section of any leading
college's newspaper will often show advertisements seeking egg
donors from physically attractive, highly educated females of
115. Casey, 505 U.S. at 929.
116. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 2008, c. 22, § 11, sch. 2 (Eng.).
117. Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2 (Can.).
118. Id. at § 5(e).
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specific races."9 High five-figure premiums are placed on these
"well-pedigreed" eggs.'20 Since egg "donation" programs are mostly
run by private infertility clinics, occur early in the reproductive
process, and are not considered to involve sale of body organs (eggs
and sperm are deemed bodily products), effective governmental
oversight is significantly lacking.
Regardless of the medical or non-medical purpose behind
reproductive screening technologies, attempts at governmental
limitations of these technologies will run into similar barriers as
regulation of the egg and sperm "donation" market. Screening, like
donation, occurs early in the reproductive timeline. Noninvasive
procedures, such as preimplantation genetic diagnosis, are done
prior to the embryo being placed in a host's body. Even invasive
procedures like amniocentesis, sampling of the amniotic fluid that
surrounds a developing fetus to examine fetal DNA, occur during
the second trimester. The Supreme Court held ir' Roe and Casey
that the State's "important and legitimate interest in protecting the
potentiality of human life" only gains great weight in comparison to
the strength of a woman's liberty interest when the fetus reaches
viability.' Given that at the latest, screening takes places during
the second trimester where the fetus still toes the line of
independent existence outside the womb-although advances in
medical technology may eventually push up viability-decisions
based on information gleaned from screening would have already
been made by then. Therefore, absent narrow tailoring and clear
indication of aggregate harm, governmental limits on the use of
reproductive screening technologies will be unlikely to pass strict
scrutiny review. Furthermore, even if publicly funded medical
institutions are prevented from offering reproductive screening for
certain non-medical purposes, the willingness of the private sector
to meet demand would undermine the purpose of the ban anyways.
119. Annie M. Lowrey, Will You Be My Baby's Mama? The Egg Donor Market Wants
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V. Alternatives to Placing Governmental Limitations on the
Use of Reproductive Screening Technologies
However, governmental oversight does not mean an absolute
limitation, which would be subject to strict scrutiny. In addition to
or as an alternative to outright bans on access to certain types of
non-medical and potentially discriminatory uses of screening,
regulatory bodies and professional organizations can address the
ethical problems raised by reproductive screening. In Casey, the
Court stated that:
Though the woman has a right to choose to terminate
or continue her pregnancy before viability, it does not
at all follow that the State is prohibited from taking
steps to ensure that this choice is thoughtful and
informed. Even at the earliest stages of pregnancy,
the State may enact rules and regulations designed to
encourage her to know that there are philosophic and
social arguments of great weight that can be brought
to bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy to full
term.. 122
This suggests that instead of necessarily looking for legal policing of
expanded use of genetic technology in reproduction, it could be
more productive to take a more policy-oriented approach. For
example, the United Kingdom has the Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Authority, an independent regulator that oversees the
use of gametes and embryos in fertility treatment and research.'23
Through national or state regulatory agencies, the United States can
also provide more oversight of providers of these services to ensure
that ethical lines are not crossed. This would allow monitoring of
the safety and transparency of the reproductive and genetic services
provided, as well as help for consumers to stay informed of the risks
of error inherent in screening technology. Currently, the Unites
States has no regulatory agency comparable to that in the United
Kingdom, but progress is being made. On the federal level, three
agencies share piecemeal regulation of ART, including reproductive
screening technologies. The Center for Disease Control collects and
122. Casey, 505 U.S. at 872 (O'Conner, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
123. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37, § 5 (U.K.).
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publishes data on ART procedures and success rates.'24 The Food
and Drug Administration controls approval and use of drugs and
medical devices, and has jurisdiction over testing of reproductive
tissues.'" The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services
implements the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act to ensure the
quality of laboratory testing.'26 However, no agency has collected or
can provide comprehensive data on the use of reproductive
screening technologies and in particular, the extent and impact of
non-medical use. Without such data, it will be difficult to draw lines
around governmental regulation of this industry.
Even with governmental agency oversight, some may claim that
regulations cannot reflect the expertise and flexibility needed to
effectively control reproductive screening technologies. This
effective control requires balancing all stakeholder interests and
adapting to rapidly evolving technology. Therefore, some argue
that "[t]he medical profession is far better situated to self-regulate
health practices, including the morally debatable ones," and that the
government should focus more broadly on "influenc[ing] and
encourag[ing] the appropriate professional societies to take
action."'"7  Medical societies such as the American Society for
Reproductive Medicine have created clinical practice guidelines
addressing issues such as how many embryos to implant in any in
vitro fertilization cycle.'28 In addition, the medical profession also
self-regulates via methods such a licensing and board certification
requirements to ensure that medically and ethically sound advice
are given to individuals seeking technological assistance in
reproduction. Many physicians and researchers also feel that
oversight is more appropriate coming from the medical community
given the face-to-face relationship that medical providers have with
their patients.
In an ideal world, self-regulation would be sufficient. However,
healthcare providers practice under a wide array of beliefs. While
124. Assisted Reproductive Technology, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/art/ (last updated Aug. 28, 2014).
125. CHARLES P. KINDREGAN & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE, 195-97 (2006).
126. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments, CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.gov/
Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/CLIA/index.html (last updated Aug. 28, 2014).
127. Bratislav Stankovic, "It's a Designer Baby!": Opinions on Regulation of
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 2005 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 3, 30 (2005).
128. Practice Committee Documents, AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR REPRODUCTIVE
MEDICINE, http://www.asrm.org/Guidelines/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2014).
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that diversity lends patients the choice to find someone whom they
are comfortable with to address private health problems, it also
enables patients who are turned down by one practitioner to find
another more willing provider. Perhaps as an assurance of a last
resort, civil liability such as medical malpractice may temper the
more mercenary motives of healthcare providers. Nonetheless, it is
clear that private and governmental regulation must operate in
tandem to address the societal issues that growing use of
reproductive screening technologies bring.
Conclusion
As I suggested at the beginning of this Note, while it is clear
that eugenics and its surrounding ideas no longer exist in the same
sweeping, over-simplistic, and racially biased form as they did in the
early twentieth century, the legal, ethical, and social conflicts around
the use of reproductive screening technologies will only grow as
scientific advances afford consumers more choice. The Constitution
recognizes a privacy interest in procreative autonomy that will make
it difficult to place limits on private actions and will examine state
regulation of medical reproductive screening under a strict scrutiny
standard. However, depending on the use of the technologies,
access to non-medical screening may be subject to broader
regulation if the technologies impose serious harms on the persons
most directly affected by them. But, since governmental regulation
is lagging, professional safeguards should be the first line of
protection against unethical uses of reproductive screening
technologies. Overall, a commitment to exploring legal avenues and
self-regulation in an increasingly technology-driven reproductive
process will prevent a "backdoor to eugenics" and allow the human
population to truly flourish.
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